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Abstract
The increased use of online social networks for the dis-
semination of information comes with the misuse of
the internet for cyberbullying, cybercrime, spam, van-
dalism, amongst other things. To proactively identify
abuse in the networks, we propose a model to iden-
tify abusive posts by crowdsourcing. The crowdsourc-
ing part of the detection mechanism is implemented im-
plicitly, by simply observing the natural interaction be-
tween users encountering the messages. We explore the
node-to-node spread of information on Twitter and pro-
pose a model that predicts the abuse level (abusive, hate,
spam, normal) associated with the tweet by observing
the attributes of the message, along with those of the
users interacting with it. We demonstrate that the dif-
ference in users’ interactions with abusive posts can be
leveraged in identifying posts of varying abuse levels.
1 Introduction
The use of online social networks (OSNs) like Twitter for
the dissemination of information around the world contin-
ues to increase in today’s society. Due to their wide reach,
oversimplified conversations, anonymity, and ability to pro-
vide quick blasts of information, online social networks have
also become an avenue for various cyberbullying and ha-
rassment. The common exchange and banters in social net-
working platforms can sometimes become explosive, result-
ing in uncontrolled expression of hate, harassment, and ag-
gression without the risk of reciprocal physical injury or
personal danger. In recent times, there have been reports
of mental and psychological health issues directly linked
to abuse, harassment, and cyberbullying (Singleton, Abeles,
and Smith 2016)(Landstedt and Persson 2014)(He´bert et al.
2016)(Goebert et al. 2011). To curtail these abusive behav-
iors, there is a need to quickly identify posts intended for
abuse, and have them expunged from the network to reduce
users’ exposure.
Not all messages shared with abusive intent are written
crudely. A message intended as abuse might be concealed in
sarcasm, emotions, and sentiments even if it appears other-
wise. We hypothesize that there is a difference in the diffu-
sion of abusive posts in OSNs, a difference that can be lever-
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aged by using a crowdsourcing approach to predict the abu-
sive label associated with these posts. We believe that some
users are more likely than others to create, share, and/or re-
act to abusive posts. These users will serve as discrimina-
tors in the detection model to sieve out outliers who do not
contribute much to the detection task. We adopt an implicit
crowdsourcing model by simply observing users’ interaction
with posts of varying abuse levels to ensure that the user’s
posting and reaction behavior is as natural as it can be. In
this study, we introduce an automated model for predicting
the abuse level associated with a tweet predicated on the in-
teraction between users encountering the messages. We de-
scribe two types of posts, normal and abusive. A post is said
to be abusive, if and only if the content or context associ-
ated aligns with the intent for cyber abuse. Seeing as fea-
ture design and selection strongly impact a machine learn-
ing model’s accuracy much more than the model used (Hall
1999), we train a Bayesian Logistic Regression model by
incorporating user, message, and propagation features to es-
timate the node-to-node influence dynamics to the propa-
gation of abusive posts. We describe two tasks in identify-
ing abusive behavior online and adopt supervised machine
learning models in addressing them.
1. We investigate abusive behavior prediction by exploring
abuse propagation founded on microscopic-level informa-
tion spread. By observing the spreading behavior of posts
of varying abuse levels in online social networks, we pro-
pose a model that predicts the abuse level associated with
a tweet by observing the latent attributes of the message,
along with those of the users, and their reactions over the
network.
2. We evaluate the role of user and message features in de-
tecting the abuse level of a post, by measuring the contri-
butions of individual users and their posts to the spread of
abusive posts in OSNs.
Previous crowdsourcing-based approaches in abuse detec-
tion in social networks focus on conversation or account an-
notation for abuse detection. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first research that explores crowdsourcing as an
automated tool for identifying abusive behavior in online so-
cial networks. We classify users based on the types of posts
they generally react to: (i) reacts to only normal posts, (ii) re-
acts to only abusive posts and (iii) reacts to a mix of normal
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and normal posts. Users in class i and ii are good discrimina-
tors for both abuse level detection and feature identification,
while users in class iii do not serve as good discriminators
in the prediction model. The contributions of this paper are
as follows:
• We introduce a new paradigm to abusive behavior identi-
fication that applies implicit crowdsourcing for predicting
the abuse level of a post without user annotation.
• We present a model to predict the abuse level associated
with a tweet using the propagation pattern and achieve
accuracy up to 20% higher than models that do not incor-
porate propagation patterns.
• We demonstrate the abilities of the crowdsourced model
by presenting a ranking of features relevant to abusive
post propagation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
related work on detecting abusive behavior, and features that
aid information spread in social networks. Section 3 de-
scribes the prediction tasks, proposed model, and dataset.
Section 4 presents experimental results and observations,
and finally, Section 5 gives conclusions and insights into
possible future works.
2 Related Works
Research on detecting abusive behavior online has ex-
plored numerous techniques including machine learning,
deep learning, crowdsourcing, amongst others. In this sec-
tion, we provide a brief overview of some of the studies and
methods relating to abusive behavior identification and de-
tection. We provide an additional review of feature selection
for information propagation to emphasize the role of feature
selection in detection tasks.
2.1 Feature Selection for Information
Propagation
(Guille, Hacid, and Favre 2013) introduced a variant of the
AsIC model called the T-BAsIC framework that assigns a
fixed value for a real time-dependent function for each link,
without fixing the diffusion probability. The model relies on
three different dimensions to compute the diffusion proba-
bility: social, semantic, and time. The model was designed to
predict the daily volume of tweets for a topic and variations
in popularity of topics over time. They proceeded by identi-
fying 2 types of users: (1) transmitters that pass along infor-
mation and (2) stiflers that become dead-ends for informa-
tion travel, with stiflers growing with time for a given topic.
In (Ferrara et al. 2016), the authors leverage a mixture of
metadata, network, and temporal features in detecting users
spreading extremist ideology and predict content adopters
and interaction reciprocity in social media. They adopted lo-
gistic regression and random forests learning models with 52
features observed from Twitter data of over 25,000 accounts
labeled as supportive of the Islamic State. Given the tempo-
ral relevance of tweets, (Spasojevic et al. 2015) propose find-
ing the best times for a user to post on social networks in or-
der to maximize the probability of audience response. They
hypothesize that the probability that an audience member re-
acts to a message depends on factors such as his daily and
weekly behavior patterns, his location and timezone, and the
volume of other messages competing for his attention.
2.2 Models for Abusive Behavior Detection
As OSNs become interesting targets for spammers and ma-
licious users, (Verma and Sofat 2014) reviewed literature
to identify features used for detecting spam and malicious
users. They pointed out that spam detection algorithms com-
monly explore features categorized as user-based, content-
based, and hybrid (combining user and content-based fea-
tures. Badjatiya et al. applied several deep learning models
with pre-trained word embedding over a dataset of 16k la-
beled tweets to classify tweets as racist, sexist, or neither.
The best results from their experiments were derived by
training with Long Short Term Memory networks (LSTMs)
and embedding with a Gradient Boosted Decision Trees
(GBDT) (Badjatiya et al. 2017). The work of (Nobata et
al. 2016) describes a supervised learning system for detect-
ing abusive language in online comments. Token unigrams
and bigrams, and character n-grams were extracted from a
dataset of 2 million Yahoo finance and news article com-
ments. They adopted a classifier based on linguistic and syn-
tactic features to achieve an F-score of 0.795 for Finance
comments and 0.817 for News comments. To classify Twit-
ter users as aggressors, bullies, or spammers, (Chatzakou et
al. 2017) developed a classifier based on random forests to
identify aggressive and bullying accounts. The model used a
combination of user, text, and network features for its iden-
tification task. Almaatouq et al. presented an analysis of sus-
pended spam accounts on Twitter. Using Gaussian Mixture
Model, the authors discovered that there are two primary cat-
egories of spammers on Twitter with distinct behavior. They
hypothesized that the first group mainly consists of fraud-
ulent accounts, while the second is made up of legitimate
accounts that have been compromised.
2.3 Crowdsourcing Techniques for Offensive
Behavior Identification
CrowdFlower is a popular tool among researchers for label-
ing data for research requiring labeled data as ground truth.
The researchers in (Burnap and Williams 2015) used Crowd-
Flower to label 2000 tweets by having annotators answer
the question ”Is this text offensive or antagonistic in terms
of race, ethnicity, or religion?”. They used the labeled data
in a machine learning classifier for identifying hateful and
antagonistic content on Twitter. Founta et al. used Crowd-
Flower to annotate a large collection of tweets with a set of
abuse-related labels. Their research covers different forms
of abusive behavior in order to identify a robust and con-
sistent set of labels - abusive, hateful, normal, and spam -
to characterize abuse-related tweets. To distinguish between
hate speech and everyday usage of potentially offensive lan-
guage in tweets, (Davidson et al. 2017) presented an au-
tomated model to classify tweets as hate speech, offensive
language, or neither. They used labeled data crowdsourced
using CrowdFlower and adopted a logistic regression model
with L2 regularization to identify hate speech.
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On examining the mislabeled hateful tweets in the work
of (Davidson et al. 2017), they observed that some were
possibly incorrectly labeled in the crowdsourcing step, and
some contained few of the terms commonly associated with
hate speech. Tweets with less common slurs were also fre-
quently mislabeled. One of the challenges to crowdsourcing
is to ensure workers provide objective and truthful reporting.
A lot of sites rely on posters to crowdsource the identifica-
tion of abusive content because it is impossible for modera-
tors to identify all abusive content. The research of (Ghosh,
Kale, and McAfee 2011) presented an algorithm where users
rate content based on a set of ratings and the users also get
rated based on the probability that they will correctly label
a contribution. To account for the trustworthiness of crowd-
sourced content, (Wang et al. 2016) proposed a bidding and
incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsourcing. To ensure
trustworthy submissions, the authors applied Evolutionary
Game Theory to ensure that the best strategy for workers
was to submit trustworthy data. Each worker is assigned
a reputation score, which begins at a maximum but is de-
creased if a worker submits untrustworthy data. It is also
increased if the worker submits trustworthy data. Different
tasks on the platform have different reputation thresholds,
which workers must exceed to work on the task. This makes
reporting trustworthy data the most stable strategy for work-
ers.
In crowdsourcing tasks, especially when backed by incen-
tives, participants may introduce an implicit bias in the data
brought about by the “presence” of an observer, leading to
a change in behavior (Jhangiani et al. 2019) or opinion and
causing them to provide feedback that they feel is expected
or sense what the “community” rewards, and comply. By
contrast, our proposed crowdsourcing mechanism aims to
observe users in the wild, making it less subject to the bias
introduced by conscious detection.
3 Model and Method
We propose a framework that given a tweet will predict
the abuse level by observing the user interaction with the
tweet – we leverage “the wisdom of the crowd” as it is often
used in a crowdsourcing approach to assigning a label to the
post. The proposed model differs from current crowdsourc-
ing techniques in that it makes an inference from a super-
vised learning task and does not require a human annotator.
Since this is a supervised learning task, the model requires
labeled data and makes use of manually annotated tweets
for learning and inference. To each user, we associate a to-
tal of 16 features, including 3 network and 13 interaction
attributes; and to each message, we associate 11 attributes.
We then train a Bayesian logistic regression model based on
the prediction task.
3.1 Data Description
In this study, we make use of the ICWSM 2020 task 2 dataset
made publicly available by (Founta et al. 2018). The dataset
contains 100k annotated tweets associated with inappropri-
ate speech labeled as abusive and hateful speech, as well as
normal interactions and spam. Because the model we pro-
pose makes use of attributes of the user for inference, we
used a tweet Hydrator - an Electron-based desktop applica-
tion for hydrating Twitter ID datasets (DocNow 2016). The
Hydrator helps us turn tweet IDs back into JSON, retrieving
information contained in the Tweet and User Objects.
Since tweets get deleted from time to time, by the user or
Twitter, some tweets were no longer available through the
Twitter API, as such, we had a reduced number of tweets
after hydration. The dataset contained over 69k tweets with
56k unique users. Tweets labeled normal made up 62% of
the dataset, abusive tweets accounted for 20%, spam tweets
constituted 14%, while hateful tweets formed 4% of the data.
We recreate the Twitter followership graph for the avail-
able dataset by associating an edge between two users
if there is a follower-followee relationship between them.
Based on the assumption that users will interact with their
friends’ messages uniquely, we assign the diffusion label as
a function of the reaction observed per message and show
that this microscopic-level information spread based on the
latent message and user interaction attributes is sufficient to
give insight to the abuse level of a message.
3.2 Task 1: Implicit Crowdsourcing for
Predicting the Abuse Level of a Tweet
First, we demonstrate the differences in the propagation of
Abusive and Normal posts, we perform a node-to-node anal-
ysis between a pair of users, the spreader and receiver, ex-
amining each user’s posting behavior, and their interactions
to predict the receiver’s reaction. Here, we aim to show that
our model performs well in an established environment, to
compare with previous models for propagation prediction.
This task is valuable to strengthening our hypothesis that the
propagation behavior is a significant attribute to predicting
the abuse level of a message based on how users in OSN in-
teract with posts of varying veracity. We believe that a tweet
that is abusive or hate speech will stir up reaction from many
users in the network, causing it to propagate farther than a
normal or spam post will. Then, we train a model that pre-
dicts the abusive label associated with a message. We extract
the features described in Section 3.4, and additionally in-
clude the diffusion property as an independent variable dur-
ing the training phase, see Figure 1 for a conceptual illustra-
tion of the model.
Figure 1: Model for implicit crowdsourcing for predicting
abuse level of a tweet
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More specifically, an edge is said to be diffused if and only
if the destination user (in Twitter terms: follower) has re-
acted (reply, retweet, quote, like) to the friend’s (followee’s)
post. We examine how users on Twitter relate with posts of
their friends by building classifiers to distinguish user inter-
actions based on the abusive label associated with the mes-
sage. For a message m, where m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, spreading
over a network with n interactions, we train a model that
predicts the abusive label associated with the message based
on the diffusion behavior observed along each one of the
n links along which the message propagates. The predicted
output is the majority abusive label observed across the n in-
teractions. For instance, if an abusive message is spread over
5 interactions and the model predicts the post to be abusive
3 out of 5 times, we accept the output to be abusive and eval-
uate the model over its correct classification of M messages
in the test collection.
By comparison, the non-crowdsourced model relies solely
on the features of the message and those of the original cre-
ator of the message in making a decision on the truth-status
of the tweet.
3.3 Task 2: Estimating Features Contributing to
Abusive Tweet Propagation
We perform a supervised learning task where we train the
model using the attributes from a pair of nodes with an estab-
lished followership relationship and label the interaction be-
tween them as either diffused or not diffused. The attributes
learned are said to be representative of users’ network, in-
teraction, participation, role, and importance in the spread
of information to other nodes in the network. As previously
stated, these attributes are learned over four different time
intervals. After learning these features, we fit a regression
function that maps the learned user attributes to the likeli-
hood of diffusion between the nodes. In this task, we de-
scribe two sub-tasks:
1. We build a persona for the user to evaluate the user’s ten-
dency to post or react to posts of different abuse levels.
2. We explore the node-to-node relationship between users
and seek to identify features that cause abusive posts to
propagate.
For each user in the dataset, we assign an abusive,
hate, spam, or normal score computed as a ratio of their
post that is labeled as such. For each label i, where i ∈
{abusive, hate, spam, normal}
scorei =
counti
N
(1)
where N is the total number of tweets the user has in the
collection.
Task 2.1: Evaluating a user’s tendency to post or reactive
to abusive posts For the purpose of this data challenge, we
assume a user’s total tweets to be limited to the data in the
collection. However, for a more robust prediction task, it is
important that the score estimated in eqn (1) is estimated
over the tweets shared on the user’s timeline. For each user,
we create an online persona by combining the user features,
message-based features (over all of the user’s messages) and
the estimated abusive scores. We perform regression analy-
sis on this behavioral pattern and then train a Random Forest
classifier to rank the features that directly impact the proba-
bility that a user will post or react to a message that is labeled
abusive or hateful. Currently, we limit the prediction task to
focus on estimating a user’s probability to post or react to
abusive and/or hateful posts as these kinds of behavior are
not as widely studied as spam.
Task 2.2: Identifying features for abusive post propaga-
tion We perform a supervised learning task where we train
the model using the attributes from a pair of nodes with an
established followership relationship and label the interac-
tion between them as either diffused or not diffused. The
attributes learned are said to be representative of the user’s
profile, messages, network, interaction, participation, role,
and importance in the spread of information to other nodes
in the network. After learning these features, we fit a regres-
sion function that maps the learned user attributes to the like-
lihood of diffusion between the nodes. Then, we present a
ranking of the features that contribute to the likelihood of
abusive and hate tweets diffusing over the network.
3.4 Feature Description
We suggest 3 categories of features: message, interaction,
network, and train a random forest classifier to rank the fea-
tures in order of importance. The features highlighted here
are combined with the diffusion label as part of the input
variables in the bayesian logistic regression model used in
Task 1.
Network-based features In microblogs such as Twitter,
a friend is someone a user follows, and a user can see all
of his friend’s posts. In like manner, a follower is some-
one that follows and has direct access to all of a user’s
posts. We consider three features of the user’s network: fol-
lowers count, friends count, which have been extensively
studied by (Castillo, Mendoza, and Poblete 2011)(Liang et
al. 2015)(Yang et al. 2012), and followers to friends ratio,
which was used in (Wu, Yang, and Zhu 2015) to establish
opinion leaders. These attributes are important because a
user’s friends impact the kind and volume of messages that
end up in his timeline and the higher the number of fol-
lowers, the farther the possibility of reach. This is also re-
flected in policies by OSNs like Twitter and Instagram who
attach value to the follower count, where users become ver-
ified once they cross a certain threshold, even if the account
holder is not a celebrity or public figure. Table 1 describes
the network features used in the model.
Feature Description
followers count higher count depict higher reach
friends count # of accounts user follows
followers-friend ratio to show influence in the network
Table 1: Network-based features
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Interaction-based Features We identify specific at-
tributes of the user’s online persona and posting behavior as
a contributor to the user exhibiting abusive behavior online.
The assumption is that both the follower and followee con-
tribute equally to the diffusion of a post, and an aggregate
of network and message attributes tilt the reaction decision.
Table 2 describes the 13 interaction attributes being consid-
ered.
Feature Description
directed tweets ratio of tweets directed at someone
dialogue active interaction from user 1 to 2
retweet-to-tweet ratio of user’s tweets with retweet
tweet wit hashtag ratio of user’s tweets that contain hashtags
tweets with url ratio of user’s posts with URL
tweets with media ratio of user’s posts with media
avg favorite-tweet ratio of posts that get favorited
avg tweets/day shows how active the user is
has url does user’s profile have a URL
has description does user’s profile have description
is verified is the account verified
status count volume of tweets over account’s lifetime
account age # of days since account was created
Table 2: Interaction-based features
Message-based Features We perform content analysis by
adopting the sentiment analysis framework provided by
TextBlob (Loria 2018) to assign sentiment score to the mes-
sage. Table 3 describe the message attributes adopted in our
model.
Feature Description
quoted status has post been quoted
is rt has post been retweet
rt count # of retweets
rt status is post a retweet
favorited count # of favorites
has hashtag does post contain hashtags
has url does post contain URL
has mentions does post mention someone using “@”
has media does post contain media
avg tweet length length of tweet / 280 (max length)
sentiment score polarity of tweet
Table 3: Message-based Features
3.5 Evaluation Metrics
The prediction capabilities of the learned model are tested
based on its abilities to predict if there is diffusion across an
edge given the learned model. We use standard classification
evaluation metrics: precision, recall and, F score, to assess
the efficiency of our model.
Precision describes the ratio of instances correctly classi-
fied as “diffused” to the total classified as “diffused”, and is
estimated as:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(2)
Recall is the ratio of instances correctly classified as “dif-
fused” to the total number of instances that “diffused”, and
is estimated as:
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (3)
Where TP (true positives) is the number of instances cor-
rectly classified as “diffused”, FP (false positives) is the
number of instances incorrectly classified as “diffused”, and
FN (false negatives) is the number of the instances incor-
rectly classified as “ not diffused”.
The F score is the harmonic mean of the precision and
recall. It is computed as
Fscore = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(4)
4 Results
4.1 Predicting Abuse Level using Implicit
Crowdsourcing
By simply observing the reaction generated between users in
the network, we train a model that learns to distinguish the
interaction-reaction relationship. The model’s ability to ef-
fectively distinguish the uniqueness of this relationship over
messages of different abuse levels is useful in detecting the
abuse label associated with a message by observing the re-
action and in turn, propagation of the message over the net-
work. As previously stated, the objective of this task is to
show that collating the implicitly sourced diffusion behavior
between users is useful for detecting the abusive behavior of
a post. This implicit crowdsourcing approach is important in
real-world situations where there is a need for the system to
passively interact with the network.
We carry out prediction tasks to detect the abuse levels
associated with a tweet and we included an additional task
to predict if a post is offensive (abusive OR hate). In Table
4, we show the performance of the model using the evalua-
tion metrics described in Section 3.5, with the dataset split in
a 60-30-10 train-validation-test ratio. We present the preci-
sion, recall, and F1 scores for the crowdsourced model (CRO
- *) and differentiate it from the non-crowdsourced (non-
CRO - *) model. From the results, we observed that predic-
tion tasks using the crowdsourced model performed consid-
erably better recording over 20% improvement than the non-
crowdsourced model. The prediction result for posts labeled
as normal is unsurprising because the model had more data
to learn from than the other labels. For a model to implic-
itly predict the abuse level associated with a tweet, there is a
need to learn from the user’s prior interactions with the net-
work. We further argue that a user’s likelihood to create or
react to an offensive post will influence his/her future inter-
actions with similar posts. One can also argue that increased
exposure of a user to offensive posts in his/her network will
increase his chances of posting the same.
4.2 Features for Abusive Behavior Propagation
Here, we model the user’s participation in the spread of abu-
sive posts on Twitter and use the knowledge to measure the
contribution of individual user in the creation and spread of
abusive posts in OSNs.
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Abuse level CRO - Precision CRO - Recall CRO - F1 nonCRO - Precision nonCRO - Recall nonCRO - F1
Abusive 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.65 0.71 0.68
Hate 0.82 0.89 0.85 0.61 0.63 0.62
Spam 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.67 0.69 0.68
Normal 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.80 0.85 0.82
Abusive+Hate 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.74 0.79 0.76
Table 4: Model performance in abuse level of a post
Features impacting user’s propensity for abusive posts
On Twitter, a user can show his/her interest in a topic by con-
tributing to the topic through the creation of posts, retweets,
replies, quotes, etc. By contributing to a given topic, users
give little hints into their interests, possibly patterns to their
behavior and expected reactions. We group tweets labeled as
abusive and hate together as abusive posts. Even though the
data is heavily skewed towards normal posts, result from the
experiment shows that the sentiment around the topic plays
a major role in whether a user will post something abusive
about it. Following closely to sentiment is the abusive score,
this is unsurprising because a user with a high abusive score
will most likely keep posting abusive tweets. As expected,
the normal score ranks side by side the abusive score as they
complement each other. Ranked next to that are the user fa-
vorite and average tweet per day. We observed that users
with more friends than followers are more likely to exhibit
abusive behaviors.
These features are only descriptive of the user’s own ten-
dencies towards abusive posts. It is important to note that
identifiable events in the network can also contribute to a
user’s disposition to share abusive posts at a particular point
in time. The presence of media (such as memes, emojis, and
sometimes images with text) poses a challenge to this task
as some of these media might contain offensive content that
the model is unable to interpret. Due to the fluidity of the
Twitter interaction, language, and user interests, we believe
this task will perform better as a semi-supervised learning
task where the model learns to adapt to the dynamic nature
of the Twitter network.
Features impacting abusive post propagation Establish-
ing a difference in the diffusion prediction models for abu-
sive and normal posts is amply dependent on showing that
there exists a difference between these types of messages
and the attributes that steer user reactions. In previous tasks,
we have shown that the detection models differ from one
abusive label to another, here, we show that the messages
propagate differently by providing evidence that the at-
tributes contributing to diffusion differ between abusive and
normal posts. Please recall that abusive posts are described
as tweets in the data associated with abusive and hate labels.
To further validate our assumption that there is a differ-
ence associated with the message, interaction and diffusion
patterns of abusive and normal posts, we use random forest
classifiers to provide the top-10 features, see Table 5 that aid
in the propagation of abusive and normal messages. In this
task, we model the diffusion of posts from one user to an-
other and observe the reaction of the receiving user. We learn
a function that maps what features of the source and desti-
nation users cause a reaction or otherwise. We measure the
model’s ability to correctly predict a user’s reaction based
on the learned function.
Rank Abusive Normal
1 dest friends count MSG is RT
2 dialogue MSG has mentions
3 MSG has mentions MSG favorited count
4 dest tweet with hashtag src tweets with URL
5 src retweet-to-tweet dest retweet-to-tweet
6 src status count MSG sentiment score
7 src followers count src directed tweet
8 MSG sentiment score dialogue
9 src followers-friends src avg favorite-tweet
10 MSG has hashtag dest follower-friends
Table 5: Top 10 features for predicting propagation of abu-
sive and normal posts selected using Random Forest classi-
fiers
From the ranked features, we see that the sentiment score
and established dialogue is deemed important in the diffu-
sion of posts between two users. The network features are
ranked as important to the spread of abusive posts. One thing
to note here is that a single user can act as both the source
or destination node in the network, depending on his role
at a particular point in time. Additionally, the presence of
hashtag(s) in a tweet has an effect on its likelihood to get a
reaction.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we hypothesize that there is a difference in the
spreading behavior of posts with varying abuse levels. We
presented a model based on Bayesian logistic regression to
predict the abuse level of a message by simply crowdsourc-
ing the interaction and propagation behaviors of similar mes-
sages. The crowdsourcing detection model integrates infor-
mation diffusion by using the diffusion label (“diffused” or
“not diffused”) associated with the node-to-node interaction
between a pair of users. Results from our experiment show
an improvement of about 20% over models that are non-
crowdsourced.
One way to extend this work will be to assign an abusive
score for a user based on the emotions his/her posts incite in
the network and the responses the messages get i.e., a user
will be deemed more abusive if he incites abusive and/or
hateful responses within the network.
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